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Abstract: The last few years have seen a paradigm shift in European security. NATO and 
Russia are once again stepping up their military activities and building their military arsenals, 
as deep mistrust and the fear of unintended military escalation seem to have returned. Over the 
last few decades, such concerns could be mitigated by an interlocking web of arms control and 
confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM). Now, these regimes are significantly 
outdated and no longer reflect the political, military and technological developments of today. 
Concentrating on the Vienna Document, this article discusses three possible scenarios and 
presents concrete ideas for the future of CSBM in Europe. 
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In 1945, at the end of the most devastating war in world history, there was hope for a more 
stable and peaceful Europe. Instead, the decades that followed were characterized by mistrust, 
and a dangerous escalation spiral emerged. Although fear of nuclear annihilation dominated 
much of the Cold War security landscape, Europe also saw a conventional arms race of an 
unimaginable extent. At the height of the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 
more than nine million soldiers, 60,000 battle tanks, 130,000 armoured vehicles and 
approximately 2,000 attack helicopters were facing off against each other (NATO, 1984). 
Negotiations aimed at reducing the risks emanating from this political and military 
confrontation had already started during the Conference for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE) in the early 1970s. These negotiations led to the first sets of Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures (CSBM) contained in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and in the 
Stockholm Document of 1986, both being direct predecessors of the Vienna Document that is 
still in place today (Goldblat, 2002: 257–265). When the Cold War finally came to an end and 
the CSCE became the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), both 
sides had not only been able to overcome the block-to-block confrontation that had divided the 
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continent for more than four decades, but had also created “a web of interlocking and mutually 
reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments” (OSCE Lisbon Summit, 1996: 17).1 
Today, about twenty years later, more and more cracks in this interlocking web are becoming 
evident. Due to the lack of political will on the part of key stakeholders, first by NATO 
countries, today by Russia, the CSBM regimes currently in place are increasingly outdated and 
seem no longer able to provide sufficient levels of military transparency and predictability given 
the political, military and technological developments of today. Not least since the Ukrainian 
crisis, more and more voices can be heard arguing that the existing arms control and CSBM 
architecture may even be at risk of fully collapsing. 
 
Against this background, this article raises the question of whether it is possible to go back to 
the future2 and to refurbish the European arms control and Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures (CSBM) architecture. To this end, I will look specifically at the OSCE Vienna 
Document 2011 on CSBM and begin by identifying some of the biggest challenges to the 
document, before concluding with a critical reflection on three possible strategies for 
approaching the future of military confidence-building in Europe: maintenance measures, 
substantial modernization or a complete redesign. While this article cannot solve the issue of 
recurring political deadlocks regarding the modernization of arms control and CSBM in Europe, 
we should still not shy away from developing new and innovative ideas for their future. 
Therefore, this article will not only reflect on the most likely modernization scenario to unfold, 




2 Smaller. Faster. More Hybrid. – The Main Challenges to Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures in Europe Today 
 
                                                 
 
1  A more thorough historical overview of the developments of arms control and CSBM in Europe can for 
example be found in Goldblat J (2002) Arms control: The new guide to negotiations and agreements. London, 
Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, or Rittberger V, Efinger M and Mendler M (1990) Toward an East-
West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Journal of Peace Research 
27(1): 55–74.  
2  Like the title of this article, this is an ironic reference to John Mearsheimer’s controversial article “Back to 
the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War” from 1990, in which he predicted Europe’s backlash into 
large-scale military confrontation as soon as the threat of nuclear annihilation and the bipolar world order 
would disappear (Mearsheimer, 1990), a scenario that fortunately did not evolve. 
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Mistrust and hard security concerns, such as the fear of surprise attacks disguised as regular 
military exercises, dominated much of the immediate post-Cold War European security 
landscape. For many years, CSBM like the Vienna Document or the Treaty on Open Skies (OS) 
were able to address these concerns (e.g. through the prior announcement and observation of 
larger military exercises) and served as an important complement to more substantial 
disarmament and arms control steps such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe (CFE-Treaty) that led to the destruction of more than 60,000 heavy weapons systems 
in Europe (German Federal Foreign Office). Besides the regulations for larger military 
exercises, this politically-binding document also contains annual exchanges of military 
information (e.g. about the numbers and peacetime locations of land and air forces, certain types 
of their heavy military equipment, as well as defence budgets, military doctrines and the 
acquisition and commissioning of new weapon systems), various means of verification,3 several 
risk reduction mechanisms (e.g. a consultation mechanism in case of unusual military activities) 
and various forms of direct military-to-military contacts (e.g. regular seminars on changes in 
military doctrines). In short, other than traditional forms of arms control, CSBM do not usually 
limit military forces and their activities in size, but rather serve as an important tool that 
facilitates the de-escalation of a crisis before it turns into an open military confrontation 
(Borawski, 1986: 113). 
Unfortunately, as soon as the imminent threat of arms races and surprise attacks disappeared 
from the day-to-day thinking of security practitioners, the importance of arms control and 
CSBM was seemingly forgotten. Apart from a few exceptions (e.g. Germany or the United 
States), many arms control agencies faced wide-ranging budget cuts, and numerous 
opportunities for long overdue modernization steps were missed as they faced opposing 
political interests of key stakeholders (in particular of Russia and the West). In a new climate 
of heightened suspicion, the consequences of this lack of political will for progress on arms 
control and the loss of expertise in the national verification centres are enormous. As will be 
discussed next, many of the mechanisms, once set out to prevent dangerous escalation dynamics 
and to provide transparency over military forces and their activities, are now outdated (e.g. 
Tiilikainen, 2015: 25; Koivula, 2017: 119).  
                                                 
 
3  The Vienna Document includes two main kinds of verification measures: so-called evaluation visits – meant 
to verify the annually exchanged military information under Chapter I (VDoc 2011: para. 107), as well as so-
called inspections – investigating a specified geographical area to verify the presence of any notifiable 
military activities (VDoc 2011: para. 80). 
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The increasing disconnect between existing provisions and current security needs is most 
evident in the shift from classical confrontations between large conventional armies to an 
increasing number of intrastate and hybrid conflict scenarios. This shift has not only 
substantially altered the threat and security perceptions of states, but also led to significant 
changes in command structures, military doctrines and the composition of modern military 
forces. Critically, since the end of the Cold War, deployment scenarios have changed 
significantly, and large tank armies made way for increasingly smaller, more readily deployable 
units. Their mobility and effectiveness are not only ensured by technological advancements, 
e.g. the increased operational capabilities of military drones or conventional missile systems, 
but also by the strengthened role of naval, support and logistical forces (Koivula, 2017: 123-
125). With mobility playing an increasingly important role, the ability to control and to deny 
access to certain geographical areas (known as A2/AD4) has also increased in importance and, 
as the discussions about the defence of the Baltic States (the so-called Suwalki gap5) highlight, 
has likewise become a considerable security concern (Koivula, 2017: 125-126; Williams, 
2017). These different developments have also affected the size, character and composition of 
military exercises. Furthermore, even though their size and frequency has been even further 
reduced by increasing amounts of computer-simulated exercise components,6 the tense debates 
about the size and intentions behind large military exercise like Russia’s Zapad 2017 (e.g. 
Schultz, 2017; Sutyagin, 2017) underline that the fear of surprise attacks disguised as regular 
military exercises is still a major security concern of OSCE participating States. 
However, while the political, military and technological realities substantially changed over the 
last decades, the mechanisms of the Vienna Document initially designed to dispel concerns 
about military forces and their activities have not been sufficiently adapted. For example, while 
support and logistical troops as well as A2/AD capabilities are only to a certain extent covered 
by the provisions of the Vienna Document, drones and naval forces are still completely 
excluded. In addition, the thresholds for the prior announcement and observation of military 
exercises still reflect the size and composition of military exercises as they were common during 
                                                 
 
4  A2/AD stands for ‘Anti-Access Area Denial’, defined as those military capabilities “that contribute to denying 
an adversary’s forces access to a particular region or otherwise hinder freedom of maneuver. [They] typically 
include air defenses, counter-maritime forces, and theater offensive strike weapons, such as short- or medium-
range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and other precision guided munitions” (Williams, 2017). 
5  The ‘Suwalki gap’ refers to the border area between Poland and Lithuania that also separates Belarus and the 
Russian enclave Kaliningrad. Since the narrow corridor is the only land connection of the Baltic NATO 
member states Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to NATO allies in Central Europe the Suwalki gap has become 
of particular strategic importance to the alliance. 
6  For an overview over different types of military exercises see for example Çayirci and Marinčič (2009). 
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the early 1990s, which are hardly reached anymore. Furthermore, existing provisions make it 
possible to avoid the prior announcement or observation of larger military exercises in Europe 
by: 
  splitting an exercise into several smaller components, each below the defined 
thresholds, 
 the increased use of so-called snap-exercises, exercises that are carried out without 
prior announcement to the troops involved, 
 the inclusion of troop formations that are not covered by existing regulations (e.g. land 
components of naval forces or paramilitary forces), 
 placing the exercise exactly on the border of the document’s zone of application – the 
geographical area covered by the Vienna Document.7 
Furthermore, the current state-centric focus of existing agreements also challenges their proper 
implementation in intrastate conflicts (Kapanadze et al., 2017). The inability to properly handle 
non-state actors, a lack of sufficient security guarantees for verification personnel and the 
exclusion of paramilitary forces from existing CSBM regimes make an impartial assessment of 
the security situation on the ground basically impossible. 
In sum, insufficient political attention and regular political deadlocks8 have prevented the 
adaptation of the existing CSBM and arms control architecture to an ever-changing European 
security environment. Smaller, more readily deployable units have replaced the large tank 
armies of the past. Hybrid operations, aimed at a maximum of plausible deniability, and new 
tensions between Russia and the West have deeply reshaped threat and security perceptions in 
Europe (Koivula, 2017: 127), and the bypassing of existing regulations severely hampers the 
building of trust between military forces in Europe. If existing regimes cannot be adapted to 
address these new challenges and the current process of deterioration cannot be reversed, 
CSBM run the risk of becoming increasingly obsolete in the contemporary and future European 
security environment. 
 
                                                 
 
7  Under the Vienna Document 2011 “the zone of application for CSBM is defined as […] the whole of Europe 
as well as the adjoining sea area and air space (VDoc 2011: Annex I). 
8  An overview of some of these deadlocks might for example be found in Schmidt H-J (2004) Der Wandel in 
der konventionellen Rüstungskontrolle 1989-1996. Frankfurt am Main, New York: Campus or in Grand C 
(2009) European Security and Conventional Arms Control: An Agenda for the 21st Century. In: Zellner W, 
Schmidt H-J and Neuneck G (eds) Die Zukunft konventioneller Rüstungskontrolle in Europa: The future of 




3 The Future of CSBM in Europe – Ideas and Strategies to Make CSBM fit for the 
Challenges of the 21st Century 
 
The major challenges presented above underline the urgent need to take substantial steps to 
prevent the complete disintegration of the existing arms control and CSBM architecture in 
Europe. At least theoretically, three different strategies might be applied: maintenance 
measures, substantial modernization or a complete redesign of military confidence-building in 
Europe. However, these strategies not only differ in scope, content and political ambition, but 
also in how realistic they are under current political conditions. 
 
3.1 Strategy One: Maintenance Measures 
 
The first and, given the currently difficult political climate (unfortunately), also most likely 
scenario is that of occasional maintenance measures. Instead of major adaptations to the 
structure and fundamental mechanics of the Vienna Document, this strategy focuses on smaller 
technical changes that aim to maintain or slightly improve existing provisions. Such changes 
could include the increasing of verification team sizes as well as improved procedures for 
verification measures. 
Increasing the size of verification teams – which are so far limited to a maximum of four 
(inspection) or three (evaluation visit) inspectors – would make it possible to split an inspection 
team into two sub-teams and to invite additional observers from other OSCE participating 
States to the verification team. While this is often already common practice, it is practically 
limited due to the maximum team size imposed by the document. 
Additional improved procedures for verification measures could increase the quality of 
evaluation visits and inspections and improve the safety of verification personnel. This could 
be achieved by extending inspection time should a helicopter overflight of the inspected area 
not be possible or by allowing verification teams to carry modern technical equipment such as 
digital cameras or satellite positioning devices that would improve the ability of the teams to 
navigate more safely in sensitive geographical contexts.9  
                                                 
 
9  Where national legislation prohibits the import of such devices, the receiving state should provide the 
inspectors with an adequate national replacement. 
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Many of these practical changes have already been proposed and are being discussed by OSCE 
participating States. Still, as valuable as they are, given the scope of the current crisis, it seems 
unlikely that these changes will suffice to reinvigorate the Vienna Document. Nevertheless, in 
the current tense political climate, a strategy of maintenance might still be useful for buying 
time and signalling political will until the security environment has improved again. Given the 
negative experiences of the past, in which more substantial modernization attempts lacked the 
necessary political backing even in times of low political and military tensions, this is a risky 
diplomatic gamble. Instead, it seems more likely that CSBM will continue to lose their positive 
impact on European security and that even more valuable expertise that would be urgently 
needed for a possible fresh start in the future will be lost.  
 
3.2 Strategy Two: Substantial Modernization 
 
The second strategy is substantial modernization. It builds upon the already described 
maintenance measures of the first strategy, but goes beyond to also tackle problems and gaps 
linked to the structure and mechanics of existing CSBM provisions. Such substantial 
modernization steps could include the improvement of regulations meant to increase the 
transparency of military activities in Europe; the inclusion of additional troop formations, 
weapon and equipment systems; increasing and reforming quotas for verification measures; and 
the improvement of existing risk reduction mechanisms. However, especially in the current 
tense political climate, progress on these issues seems – if at all – only possible after a careful 
assessment and balancing of the extremely diverse security needs of all OSCE participating 
States. 
To improve the transparency of military activities in Europe, several modernization steps could 
be taken: 
 First, existing thresholds for the prior notification and observation of military activities 
should be considerably lowered and adapted to the scale and composition of modern 
military exercises. 
 Second, the decreasing size of military exercises has also been facilitated by an 
increasing role of computer-assisted exercises. Should such exercises also contain a live 




 Third, the loophole that makes it possible to conduct several smaller exercises at the 
same time, without falling under the provisions for prior notification and military 
observation, should be closed. This could be achieved by simply removing the condition 
that exercises need to be conducted ‘under a single operational command’ (VDoc 2011: 
para. 40.1, 44.1 and 47.1). 
 Finally, given their increasingly multilateral nature, military exercises that are 
conducted together or in close coordination with at least two other OSCE participating 
States and perhaps even on different state territories could also be included into the 
current provisions of the document. 
To reflect the structure and composition of modern armed forces and to strengthen the Vienna 
Document with regard to modern warfare, substantial modernization efforts also need to 
address the politically sensitive issue of updating and extending the list of military units, 
weapon and equipment systems regulated by the document. Besides the inclusion of drones, 
this discussion should also extend to a better inclusion of naval, support, logistical, special and 
paramilitary forces as well as transport, rapid deployment and A2/AD capabilities. Again, these 
issues are extremely sensitive for the very same reasons that they are important to be addressed, 
as they represent some of the core issues of modern warfare and defence planning. Thus, they 
will require the careful exploration of possible package deals between the different security 
interests of OSCE participating States. 
By increasing the passive quotas10 for verification measures – both for evaluation visits and 
inspections – the Vienna Document can increase the transparency of military forces and their 
activities beyond what it is today. However, given limited budgets, any increase of those quotas 
will always raise the issue of who should cover the additional costs, the inspected or the 
inspecting state. This problem might at least partially be addressed by increased collaborations 
between different arms control agencies or the establishment of OSCE-based multilateral 
inspection teams. Another option could be to provide an additional incentive by allowing the 
inspected state to conduct an additional inspection or evaluation visit of its own.11 As some 
states have in the meantime adopted a practice that often no longer distinguishes between 
inspections and evaluation visits, the merging of the two quotas into a single transparency quota 
could be considered. 
                                                 
 
10  The number of inspections and evaluation visits on the territory of a participating States allowed per year. 
11  Such a quota system would be comparable to that of the Treaty on Open Skies (OS). 
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Finally, the current risk reduction mechanism for preventing military tensions deriving from 
unusual military activities or hazardous military incidents needs to be considerably 
strengthened. So far, the mechanism (see Error! Reference source not found.), which can be 
activated in case a state has concerns about the military activities of another OSCE participating 
States, is too sensitive to political tensions between the two sides involved in the crisis and the 
success of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CiO) as a mediator will vary considerably, 
depending on whether he is viewed as an impartial third party or not. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
For example, had the Ukrainian crisis occurred just one year earlier, Ukraine would have been 
the CiO itself. In addition, the CiO lacks access to any information about the situation other 
than the information provided by the two parties and if fortunate, by other participating States 
or compiled by the OSCE Secretariat. However, a more impartial assessment of the situation is 
not possible. To overcome these problems, the role of the CiO could be replaced by a high-
ranking OSCE official, for example, a specifically appointed Special Representative for Risk 
Reduction. He or she could be situated at the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) and in 
addition of being a mediator also have the possibility to recommend the deployment of an 
OSCE fact-finding mission to the area in question to collect additional information about the 
security situation on the ground. To increase the legitimacy and security of the inspection team, 
this mission should ideally be unanimously agreed upon and consist of verification personnel 
from multiple OSCE participating States. To this end, the Special Representative could compile 
his or her team from a list of available national inspectors that would be regularly reported to 
the CPC. The final report should summarize the mission’s findings in a way that adequately 
reflect all different opinions and perspectives voiced by individual inspectors. Based on the 
findings of the report, the Special Representative might then propose additional confidence-
building measures as proposed under Chapter X. ‘Regional Measures’ of the Vienna Document, 
such as the further reduction of thresholds for prior notification and observation of military 
exercises or additional inspection quotas, in particular in border areas. In addition, such a 
redesigned mechanism could also be used to address the increasingly prevalent issue of military 
incidents (in particular in the air and at sea). OSCE participating States could consider adapting 
the existing Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security by adding a section on 
the appropriate behaviour of military forces at land, air and sea. Such a section should maintain 
the political nature of both documents and be as little technical as possible. Should the crisis 
situation involve non-state actors or other types of irregular forces that do not allow for the 
direct implementation of Vienna Document provisions (e.g. because of potential status-
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implications), measures as stipulated by the OSCE document on Stabilizing Measures for 
Localized Crisis Situations might be employed.  
Again, some of these ideas have already been proposed by OSCE participating States (e.g. the 
lowering of thresholds or the strengthening of the document’s risk reduction mechanisms). 
Others are probably (at least for now) too sensitive (e.g. the inclusion of additional weapon 
categories and troop formations). Unfortunately, as crucial as all of these modernization efforts 
would be for making the Vienna Document fit for the challenges of the 21st century, the current 
prospects for their actual realization are extremely bleak. In fact, progress might only be 
achieved after a careful assessment and balancing of the different security interests and needs 
of OSCE participating States, if it is achieved at all. In particular, as some of the suggested 
changes (e.g. the lowering of thresholds) will affect some states considerably more than others, 
it remains questionable if such a balance can be achieved solely within the mandate and 
provisions of the Vienna Document. This problem is further intensified by the fact that the 
current rifts in European security also affect the nuclear security dimension, e.g. the dispute 
around NATO’s missile defence plans (Neuneck, 2017: 46–47) or mutual allegations regarding 
the violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) (Vuorio, 2017: 107–108). 
 
3.3 Strategy Three: Complete Redesign 
 
The final and most difficult to achieve strategy is a complete redesign of CSBM in the OSCE 
area. Such a process would need to take place outside the structural and conceptual constraints 
of existing provisions and take a completely fresh look at how current threat and security 
perceptions can be addressed by entirely new, but also by substantially adapted mechanisms of 
existing CSBM regimes. The goal is to create an entirely new CSBM regime, a ‘Vienna 
Document 2.0’. The prospects for such an ambitious goal are of course bleak and a new regime 
could take many different shapes. Nevertheless, I would still like to present two ideas as food-
for-thought: an entirely new quota system, based on the actual military activities of OSCE 
participating States, as well as stronger linkages to other arms control and CSBM regimes. 
As the tense debates about the size and intentions behind Russia’s military exercise Zapad 2017 
highlight (e.g. Schultz, 2017; Sutyagin, 2017), the fear of surprise attacks disguised as regular 
military exercises is still a major security concern of OSCE participating States. A redesigned 
CSBM regime in Europe should therefore look into innovative new ways for addressing the 
issue of the transparency of military activities and could consider an entirely new quota system 
in addition to the already discussed changes to thresholds and the risk reduction mechanism. A 
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major problem under the current provisions is that each participating States is only required to 
accept three inspections per year, regardless of the size of its armed forces, of its territory or – 
most importantly – the intensity of its military activities throughout the year. Thus, an entirely 
new, more adaptive and flexible system containing the following components should be 
considered: 
First, the quotas for inspections should be set in relation to the size of a state’s territory and 
merged with those for evaluation visits (currently one for every sixty units reported in the 
annual information exchange) into a single ‘CSBM quota’ (see Table 1). Other participating 
States would be free to decide whether they want to use the quota to conduct inspections or 
evaluation visits, which also solves the issue of how to treat participating States that do have 
troops and equipment, but not national territory in the zone of application. As a general rule, 
the larger a country’s territory and/or armed forces in the zone of application, the more passive 
quotas this state has to provide. 
 Small State Medium State Large State 
    
Passive Quota    
from size of armed forces 1 3 5 
from size of territory 3 4 5 
Total 4 7 10 
Table 1. Simplified model for calculating the new passive CSBM verification quotas. 
Second, participating States would in addition receive an ‘annual budget for military activities 
per year’. This budget would be calculated on the basis of the numbers of troops, weapon and 
equipment systems as reported in the annual exchange of military information. Again, 
depending on the size of a state’s territory, these numbers would either be multiplied by the 
factor one, two or three (see Table 2). After every military activity of a state throughout the 
year, the number of participating troops and military equipment will be deducted from the 
state’s activity budget. If the budget is used up, additional passive quotas will be required (e.g. 
one extra for the first excess, a second for more than 50% etc.). To put it more simply, while a 
state with large armed forces has to provide more initial passive quotas, he is also granted the 
right to more military training activities throughout the year, before additional quotas for 
transparency are required. 
 Small State Medium State Large State 
          
Information Exchange    
military personnel 30,000 150,000 500,000 
battle tanks 100 300 800 
armoured vehicles 300 800 1,500 
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Table 2. Example for the annual military activity budget. 
Third, this system could be further strengthened by a set of additional multipliers that increase 
or decrease the actual numbers deducted from the annual activity budgets, depending on the 
level of transparency under which the activity was conducted. For example, if an exercise of 
4,000 soldiers has been announced in advance or if military observers were invited despite 
being under the agreed thresholds for notification and observation, the activity might only count 
as 3,000 soldiers (0,75 x 4,000). Were the exercise conducted as a snap-exercise, in close 
proximity to a national border or conflict area, in parallel with several other exercises, or if it 
involved troops from outside the zone of application the exercise could instead be charged with 
5,000 soldiers (1,25 x 4,000).12 A combination of different multipliers for the same exercise is 
of course also conceivable.13 In short, the main logic is that activities that could potentially 
decrease confidence and stability are covered by additional transparency requirements and vice 
versa. 
The new quota system presented here has many advantages. Being linked to the annual 
exchange of military information, the new system is no longer dependent on a regular 
readjustment of thresholds for military activities, but instead adapts automatically to any 
changes in size and composition of armed forces. Furthermore, the system strikes an important 
balance as larger armed forces and states are subject to more verification measures, but are also 
allowed to conduct more military activities throughout the year. Finally, rewarding states 
voluntarily conducting their military activities transparently and at the same time requiring 
additional transparency from states that lack this transparency seems to be as close to the initial 
core idea of CSBM as possible. 
                                                 
 
12  The numbers suggested here have only been chosen for illustrational purposes. 
13  The new quota system would of course also have significant implications for many other areas of a new 
CSBM regime (e.g. information exchanges, verification measures etc.), but unfortunately, I will not be able 
to go through all of these necessary changes here. 
etc.    
    
Activity Budget    
military personnel 30,000 300,000 1,500,000 
battle tanks 100 600 2,400 
armoured vehicles 300 1,600 4,500 
etc.    
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In addition to this, a new CSBM regime could also build stronger interlinkages (or possibly 
even be completely merged) with other arms control and CSBM regimes. This might be done 
in several ways, but I will concentrate on two examples: 
First, if naval forces would be included in a new regime, this would inevitably raise the difficult 
issue of their verification (Schmidt, 2013: 25). As naval forces can operate independently for 
several months at a time, it would only be of limited use to merely conduct evaluation visits at 
their home ports. At the same time, too precise information about their current location or even 
a verification on board naval vessels seems for safety and security reasons also for many states 
out of the question. However, verification could take place through aerial observation flights, 
e.g. under the Treaty on Open Skies (Spitzer, 2009: 11). Such flights could be cooperatively 
conducted over defined regional seas in the OSCE area (e.g. Black or Baltic Sea) to verify and 
report the presence of military vessels of OSCE participating States. To this end, OSCE 
participating States could even be requested to notify all participating States about the entrance 
or departure of any naval forces in certain areas. 
Second, CSBM could also be integrated into a new European arms control regime, substantially 
strengthening its adaptability to an ever-evolving European security environment. Instead of 
once-agreed upon fixed total ceilings, a new treaty could, for example, differentiate between 
areas of transparency, which would fall entirely under the transparency provisions of CSBM, 
whereas areas of rising political or military tensions or in close proximity to conflict areas could 
either be declared as areas of increased transparency, requiring additional information 
exchanges or verification quotas, areas of military constraint in which regional ceilings for 
certain forces, weapons and equipment systems or restrictions of certain military activities are 
required (e.g. larger snap-exercises etc.), or even as areas of crisis in which additional 
transparency and constraining provisions apply. The declaration of such areas could be 
constantly reviewed by participating States and even take into account the findings from 
possible OSCE fact-finding missions as well as the recommendations of a potential OSCE 
Special Representative for Risk Reduction. 
 
 
4 Concluding Remarks 
 
In a time of renewed tensions, the logics of military deterrence and the looming risk of an arms 
race seem to have returned to the European security landscape. Unfortunately, exactly those 
measures capable of countering the risks of dangerous misperceptions and unintended military 
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escalation dynamics are currently in rapid decay. Having contributed to military transparency, 
predictability and stability after the end of the Cold War, the European arms control and CSBM 
architecture is in urgent need of substantial modernization. Looking at the OSCE Vienna 
Document 2011, for example, it becomes evident that many regulations no longer reflect the 
political, military or technological realities of today. Having discussed possible strategies and 
presented several concrete ideas for tackling the current decay of CSBM in Europe, it is clear 
that the upcoming years will be absolutely decisive for the future of arms control and CSBM in 
Europe. Some of the ideas presented in this article are already well developed or are even 
already being discussed. Others are still at a very early conceptual stage and it remains to be 
seen if any of them will ever be seriously considered. However, all of them are meant to 
stimulate debate and to point out new possible directions for the future of CSBM.  
The first set of CSBM in 1975 was developed in a climate of heightened suspicion and military 
tensions, following a careful assessment of the persisting threat and security perceptions in 
Europe. It is thus particularly noteworthy that OSCE participating States under the German 
chairmanship in 2016 agreed to engage in a Structured Dialogue “on the current and future 
challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area” (OSCE - Ministerial Council, 2016). Now, 
it is important to keep this momentum and to once again create a conducive political climate 
for far-reaching steps on arms control. Let us go back to the future! 
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